Defense Production Act

Where the book uses it

• Chapter 8 — The Arsenal Behind Every Arsenal

  The state as customer: how the Pentagon buys frontier AI, the contract clauses a laboratory fought over, and what the courts said about a company that would not sign.

Where the record uses it

• Person Raimondo, Gina

Sources that use it

• Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, No. 3:26-cv-01996-RFL (N.D. Cal.), declaration of Sarah Heck, Anthropic’s head of policy, Dkt. 166-5, executed 10 June 2026 (a party’s sworn declaration; paragraph 17 on the meeting of 24 February 2026: “if Anthropic did not agree to ‘all lawful uses’ of its system by 5 p.m. on Friday, February 27, 2026, the Department would issue a statement at 5:01 p.m. that they would designate Anthropic a supply-chain risk—preventing Anthropic from partnering with the Department, anyone affiliated with the Department, or any other agency—or invoke the Defense Production Act to compel Anthropic to comply with the Secretary’s demands”; the court’s opinion of August 2026 says “Heck’s description of the meeting is undisputed”; her first declaration, Dkt. 6-2 of 9 March 2026, gives the same account; the Secretary’s own published words, in his post of 27 February, were “every LAWFUL purpose”, as the opinion quotes them; no statement of his own from 24 February is held). In the Sources
• Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, No. 3:26-cv-01996-RFL (N.D. Cal.), order on cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. 250), Judge Rita F. Lin, 27 August 2026 (First Amendment retaliation; due process; §3252 exceeded; arbitrary and capricious; “the empty invocation of national security is not a blank check to punish and retaliate against government critics” (page 2); as to “the version of Anthropic’s tools currently in use”, the “unrebutted record shows that DoW extensively tests Anthropic’s models before each one is deployed”; on the Department’s usage policy, “a purely contractual limit”, which “Anthropic is incapable of enforcing it technologically” (page 6); the trade associations’ members fearing similar actions without any prior “findings or process” (page 21); judgment for the defendants on “the ultra vires separation of powers claim and certain claims concerning Agency Defendants” who took no relevant action or only interim measures (page 2); each side’s motion for summary judgment “GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART” (page 58); the Department’s risk assessment “based on a core misunderstanding about how Anthropic’s technology works” (page 37); on backdoor access to its models once deployed, Anthropic “undisputedly lacks any such access” (page 1); “The only characteristic that is unique to Anthropic” … “is that it asked questions of DoW and publicly discussed the reasons for its refusal to accept DoW’s contract terms” (page 46); no basis for the §3252 finding “given the lack of any articulable basis to suspect” a covert act of sabotage (page 46); §3252’s definition as the opinion quotes it, “the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert” a covered system (page 44); “In fall 2025, DoW and Anthropic began discussing a new deployment of Claude”, when “DoW informed Anthropic that it must remove all usage restrictions to Claude” and agree to a provision allowing use of Claude “for all lawful uses” (page 7); “Anthropic agreed to eliminate most restrictions, but ultimately refused to drop restrictions of two uses: lethal autonomous warfare and mass surveillance of Americans” (page 7); the President’s post “At 3:47 p.m. on February 27, 2026”: “I am directing EVERY Federal Agency in the United States Government to IMMEDIATELY CEASE all use of Anthropic’s technology”, with “a Six Month phase out period for Agencies like the Department of War who are using Anthropic’s products” (page 10); “Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering Emil Michael” (page 8); the recommendation “attaches a four-page memorandum authored by Under Secretary Michael, dated March 2, 2026” (pages 14 to 15); “On March 5, 2026, DoW’s Chief Information Officer sent a memorandum”, which “instructs that, within 180 days, DoW components should remove Anthropic’s products ‘from all DoW systems and networks’” (page 15); “On March 4, 2026, Anthropic received a letter on DoW letterhead, signed by Secretary Hegseth and dated one day prior” (page 12); “Anthropic filed this action on March 9, 2026” (page 21); the last page stamped “Page 59 of 59”; “The Presidential Directive, the Hegseth Directive, and the Supply Chain Designation are referred to jointly as the ‘Challenged Actions’” (page 12); “38 employees from major companies in the AI field explain that the Challenged Actions threaten to ‘chill open deliberation’ and ‘professional debate’ among the people best positioned to understand AI technology” (page 21); “Defendants’ request to administratively stay the permanent injunction for a period of seven days is DENIED” (page 59); the boycott “a Final Agency Action in Excess of Statutory Authority and Contrary to Law” (page 41); “Secretary Hegseth lacked any authority to order a secondary boycott” (page 56); “Secretary Hegseth proposed applying the Defense Production Act to Anthropic, which would mean the company was essential to national security rather than a threat to it” (page 2); on February 28 the NRC “denied a ‘request to authorize [an] Anthropic Claude AI model’” (page 19); on “March 2, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reposted the Presidential Directive” (page 19); agencies “issued orders to terminate use of Anthropic’s products pursuant to the Presidential Directive, most within hours of the directive being issued” (page 53); “news reports indicated that the Office of Management and Budget began ‘setting up protocols that would allow their agencies to begin using’ Mythos, and the National Security Agency and NASA began deploying Mythos” (page 16); “NASA similarly terminated at least some access to Anthropic’s services around this time” (page 19)). In the Sources
• The Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 4501 and following, in FEMA’s compilation current through 13 August 2018, with s. 717 as amended to 2 September 2026 (s. 101(a): the President may “require that performance under contracts or orders (other than contracts of employment) which he deems necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense shall take priority over performance under any other contract or order”; s. 717(a), 50 U.S.C. 4564(a), as amended by Pub. L. 119-60 s. 8101 of 18 December 2025 and Pub. L. 119-103 s. 2004 of 2 September 2026, provides that most of the Act “shall terminate on December 11, 2026” unless extended again, the amended date read in the U.S. Code text at Cornell LII, where the FEMA compilation of 2018 still reads “shall terminate on September 30, 2025”; s. 705(a), 50 U.S.C. 4555(a): the President may obtain information “by regulation, subpoena, or otherwise”; the section says nothing of publishing an order made under it) In the Sources
• U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, “Defense Industrial Base Assessment: U.S. Microelectronics Industry,” the survey form, OMB control number 0694-0119, expiring 30 September 2024 (conducted “as required in Section 9904 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 2021 (15 USC § 4654)”; every page marked “BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL - Per Section 705(d) of the Defense Production Act”; the form’s own words: “RESPONSE TO THIS SURVEY IS REQUIRED BY LAW” and “A response to this survey is required by law (50 USC § 4555). Failure to respond can result in a maximum fine of $10,000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both”; it asks each facility for its “2022 Capacity”; dated October 2022 in the note that cites it in How to Win a Trade War; the Internet Archive’s copy of 7 October 2024 of the Bureau’s own PDF, the Bureau’s address now landing on its front page). In the Sources
• U.S. Department of Commerce, “Results from Semiconductor Supply Chain Request for Information,” 25 January 2022 (the outcome of the voluntary request: “The Department received more than 150 responses, including from nearly every major semiconductor producer and from companies in multiple consuming industries”; median buyer inventory fell from 40 days in 2019 to under 5 days in 2021; the page announces no compulsory authority, and the words “Defense Production Act” do not appear on it) — that none was ever invoked is a separate finding: no Defense Production Act order for semiconductors appears in the Federal Register, searched 16 September 2026, the log held at VERIFY 260916/item30/01e In the Sources

And 1 more: search the Sources.

Related terms

• AISI
• Amici
• Arsenal behind every arsenal
• CHIPS Act
• Fable
• Jailbreak
• Mission layer
• Mythos
• Red line